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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-STANDING TO SUE IN ENVIRONMEN-
TAL LITIGATION: SIERRA CLUB v. MORTON*
The Sierra Club, a non-profit conservation organization, obtained a
preliminary injunction in the district court restraining federal officials'
from granting their approval or issuing permits in connection with a pro-
posed recreational development2 in Mineral King Valley of the Sequoia
National Forest. The Sierra Club based its claim upon Section 10 of the
Administrative Procedure Act (A.P.A.) 3 which accords judicial review to
a ". . . person [who is] suffering legal wrong because of agency ac-
tion, or [who is] adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within
the meaning of a relevant statute. . . ."4 The Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, however, reversed the district court, holding instead that
the club lacked standing to sue because it failed to specifically allege its
interests were aggrieved or adversely affected within the meaning of the
rules of standing.5 On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of
* 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
1. The Secretary of the Interior, Secretary of Agriculture, Superintendent
of Sequoia National Park, Regional Forester, Forest Service and Forest Supervisor of
the Sequoia National Forest.
2. The proposed plan of Walt Disney Enterprises, Inc., approved by the Forest
Service, consists of a $35.3 million complex composed of motels, restaurants,
swimming pools, parking lots and other structures designed to accommodate 14,000
visitors daily. The complex is to be constructed on 80 acres of valley floor.
Other facilities include swimming pools and 20 ski lifts, as well as power generating
and sewage treatment plants.
3. 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (Supp. II, 1967).
4. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (Supp. 11, 1967). The Sierra Club contended that the Sec-
retary of Agriculture, who has the responsibility under Congress for the management
of national forests, exceeded his authority and acted arbitrarily in approving the pro-
posed master plan, and also that the Secretary of the Interior unlawfully approved
the construction of a highway and power transmission lines through and across park
lands without holding the required public hearings. The Sierra Club pleaded that
for many years, by reason of its activities and conduct, it had exhibited a special
interest in the conservation and sound management of national parks, game refuges
and forests of the United States. They asserted that they regularly served as a re-
sponsible representative of persons with similar conservation interest and alleged
that those interests would be vitally affected and aggrieved by the defendants' acts.
Brief for Appellant at 17-18, Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
5. Sierra Club v. Hickel, 433 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1970). The court stated that
Sierra Club had not alleged a sufficient interest to maintain an adversary position
between itself and the defendants. They ruled a showing of injury to a direct
legally protected interest was necessary to attack the proposed Mineral King de-
velopment. Id. at 33.
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appeals. It held: "[A] person has standing to seek judicial review under
the Administrative Procedure Act only if he can show that he himself
has suffered or will suffer injury, whether economic or otherwise." 6
Decisions in the past few years have brought a significant relaxation of
the technical requirements for standing.- The appellate court decision in
Sierra Club, however, returned to the traditional concept of standing as
one requiring the plaintiff to show a tangible injury to its interests. In af-
firming the appellate court decision, the Supreme Court would permit fed-
eral courts to deny standing to any person or group whose interest was not
"direct" and who failed to specifically allege that it or its members would
be "affected in any of their activities or pastimes. . ." by the challenged
governmental action. The Court, for example, specifically required that
the petitioner assert individualized harm to itself or its members to be ac-
corded standing to obtain review of administrative action. In the process,
the Court explicitly recognized that the interest alleged to have been in-
jured may reflect the "aesthetic, conservational and recreational as well
as economic values."1
10
The decision is broad in the sense that it qualifies a large class of indi-
vidual and organizational plaintiffs to subject governmental action to judi-
cial review. On the other hand, the decision is restrictive in the sense
that the Court re-emphasized some of the more narrow traditional no-
tions of standing11 as a prerequisite to judicial review. Thus, Sierra Club
poignantly illustrates the difficulties associated with actions instituted by
environmental action groups seeking review of administrative agency ac-
tions. Moreover, the decision also serves as a guide for future actions:
(1) by outlining the allegations necessary for plaintiffs to be accorded
6. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). The petitioner failed to
assert individualized harm to itself or its members and therefore lacked standing to
maintain the action.
7. See generally Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. CHI. L. REV.
450 (1970).
8. Appellant claimed a "special interest" by reason of its long standing role in
conservation and protection of the natural resources of the Sierra Nevada Mountains.
The complaint alleged the proposed development was "personally displeasing or dis-
tasteful" to the Sierra Club and its members. Brief for Appellant at 21, Sierra Club
v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
9. 405 U.S. at 735. The Sierra Club failed to state in its pleadings and affi-
davits that its members use the Mineral King area for any purpose much less
that their use would be affected by the proposed actions of the defendant.
10. id. at 738.
11. In Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118 (1939), the Court
ruled that one is without standing unless "the right invaded is a legal right,--one of
property, one arising out of contract, one protected against tortious invasion, or one
founded on a statute which confers a privilege." Id. at 137-38.
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"standing to sue," (2) by broadening the interests protected, and (3) by
identifying the proper persons who may successfully represent the public
interest in such litigation.
Standing to sue became a major constitutional issue in 1923 when the
Supreme Court in Frothinghiam v. Mellon 12 declined to accord judicial re-
view to a taxpayer seeking to restrain the Secretary of the Treasury from
making expenditures under an act of Congress. The Court ruled it had
no power per se to review the acts of Congress unless the plaintiff dem-
onstrated ". . . that he [has] sustained or is immediately in danger of
suffering some direct injury . . .and not merely that he suffers in some
indefinite way in common with people generally."' The direct injury or
threat of injury requirement permeated the law for the next forty years.
The doctrine of "standing to sue" was summarized in Associated Indus-
tries of New York, Inc. v. Ickes1 4 as follows:
In a suit in a federal court by a citizen against a government officer, complaining of
alleged past or threatened future unlawful conduct by the defendant, there is no jus-
ticible 'controversy,' without which, under Article 111 §2 of the Constitution, the
court has no jurisdiction, unless the citizen shows that such conduct or threatened
conduct invades or will invade a private substantive legally protected interest of the
plaintiff citizen.15
The Court went on, however, to permit actions to be brought by "any
non-official person" or group of persons specifically authorized by Con-
gress to bring a suit to "prevent action by an officer in violation of his
statutory powers."1 6  Standing, therefore, effectively barred federal court
review of certain governmental action which affected the public-at-large,
unless the complaining party could show a direct injury or threat of injury
to his legally protected interests.' 7 Lower courts invoked the stringent re-
quirements for standing to maintain the separation of powers concept.
The judiciary hesitated to review governmental acts which would assume
a position of authority over governmental acts of a coequal branch of gov-
ernment.
Baker v. Carr8 took the first significant step toward clarifying the con-
cept of standing. Unlike earlier decisions, Baker defined the fundamental
concept of standing as focusing on the party seeking review rather than
12. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
13. Id. at 488.
14. 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1943), vacated as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943).
15. Id. at 700.
16. Id. at 704. This is the "private Attorney General's" concept.
17. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961); Doremus v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 429(1952); Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943).
18. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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on the issues sought to be adjudicated. Thus, the gist of the question of
standing is whether the party seeking relief has "alleged such a personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete ad-
verseness" 19 exists. In essence, standing goes to the question of whether
the party seeking judicial review is the proper party to request an ad-
judication of a particular issue and not whether the issue itself is justicia-
ble.
The Baker decision set the pace for a trend toward relaxed require-
ments for standing and evolved a new approach to the problems sur-
rounding this area of the law. Six years later, in Flast v. Cohen,20
the Supreme Court examined the functional and consequential lim-
itations imposed by standing on the ability to sue in the federal courts.
The Court held that standing was not an absolute constitutional bar (in
reference to Article III §2) upon suits, but rather was a self-imposed rule
of restraint which required that plaintiffs show a personal stake in the out-
come of the controversy. 21  Obviously, the function served by the "per-
sonal stake" requirement was to guarantee a genuine controversy, which
sharpens the presentation of issues and is consistent with the exercise of
judicial power under the constitutional limitations of Article III. The
groundwork was thus laid for the evolution of suits challenging adminis-
trative actions along a broad line of issues. The principal struggle
emerged between the interests of individual persons or groups labeled as
either concerned citizens or environmental action groups, and the chal-
lenged acts of administrative agencies.
The decisions which set the stage for the appellate court and Supreme
Court rulings in Sierra Club outlined the criteria necessary to satisfy the
standing requirement for federal judicial review in "environmental" suits.
These decisions were split into two significant classifications: (1) actions
where the party relied upon a specific statute authorizing invocation of
the judicial process, and (2) actions where the party relied upon Section
10 of the A.P.A. 22  In Hardin v. Kentucky Utilities Co.,23 for example,
a private utility sought to enjoin the Tennessee Valley Authority from
19. Id. at 204.
20. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
21. Affirming and clarifying the Baker holding, Justice Douglas' concurring
opinion expanded the concept further by saying "[The plaintiff's] stake in the out-
come of litigation may be de mininzis by financial standards, yet very great when
measured by a particular constitutional mandate." This was a step toward recog-
nizing injury to non-economic interests as those sufficient to establish standing.
392 U.S. at 109.
22. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
23. 390 U.S. 1 (1968).
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supplying electrical power to towns primarily served by the private
utility, in contravention of a 1959 statute forbidding such activity. The
rationale expounded by the Court was that parties whose interests were to
be protected by statute have standing to ask the court to specifically en-
force those statutory provisions. The Hardin opinion is important to
Sierra Club primarily because of the negative position that has been read
into the opinion, namely that, unless the interest is specifically protected
by statute, the parties do not have standing.24
In the many cases where standing has been found, the courts have
uniformly concluded either that the plaintiffs had a "legally protected
interest," or, that Congress had created a statutory legal right in the
plaintiffs and conferred standing upon them to protect their interests.2 5
Most persons seeking judicial review, who were not specifically conferred
standing by statute, relied upon Section 10 of the A.P.A. The early
decisions construed Section 10 language under different formulations of
"legal wrong" and "legal interest" as constitutional prerequisites for
standing. 2" In Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v.
Camp 27 and Barlow v. Collins,28 the Supreme Court stated that the require-
ment of standing differs from the "legal interest" test. Standing concerns
"the question whether the interest sought to be protected by the com-
plainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regu-
lated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question. 2 9 The tradi-
tional concept of injury to a recognized legal interest was rejected. In-
stead, the Court inserted as a broad classification for interests to be pro-
tected as those which "may reflect the 'aesthetic, conservational and rec-
reational' as well as economic values." :0  The decisions continued the
24. This contention was successfully argued by government counsel in the appel-
late court. Brief for Appellant at 13, Sierra Club v. Hickel, 433 F.2d 24 (9th
Cir. 1970).
25. Citizens Committee for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 949 (1970). Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411 (1969);
Hardin v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 390 U.S. 1 (1968); Office of Communication of
United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Scenic Hudson
Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384
U.S. 941 (1966).
26. See Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118 (1939); Alabama
Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464 (1938); Kansas City Power and Light Co. v.
McKay, 225 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
27. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
28. 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
29. Ass'n of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153
(1970).
30. Id. at 154.
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trend toward enlarging the class of persons who may protest administra-
tive action and therefore gave environmental groups a considerably
stronger basis for asserting injury to their interests. While economic in-
terest had long been recognized as sufficient to lay a basis for standing
(with or without a specific statutory provision), Data Processing and
Barlow led the way toward granting plaintiffs standing based on non-
economic interests.
Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC"1 became one of the
most clearly illustrative examples of the broadened standing requirements.
Despite vigorous claims by the defendants that Scenic Hudson did not
have standing because it failed to claim the traditional "personal economic
interest,'13 2 the petitions were still heard by the court. In so holding, the
court interpreted Section 313(b) of the Federal Power Act, which gave
parties a right to review if " . . . aggrieved by an order issued by the
Commission . . . '"'- as not limited to personal economic injury, but
rather as being broad enough to include those who by their activities and
conduct have exhibited a special interest in the aesthetic, conservational
and recreational aspects of power development.- 4
Similar reasoning persuaded other courts to allow environmental ac-
tion groups the special right to challenge proposed actions of the Depart-
ment of Interior and Department of Health, Education and Welfare on
the basis of aesthetic and recreational interests of its members in lieu of
the more traditional direct economic injury. In Road Review League v.
Boyd,3 5 for example, the plaintiffs were conferred standing by the court
based on Section 10 of the A.P.A. The court stated that it could
see no reason why the word 'aggrieved' should have different meaning in the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act from the meaning given to it under the Federal Power
Act. . . . The 'relevant statute,' i.e., the Federal Highways Act, contains language
which seems even stronger than that of the Federal Power Act, as far as local and
conservation interests are concerned.3 6
Similarly, in Citizens Committee for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe,:17
plaintiffs were accorded standing to challenge the proposed construction
31. 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965). The FPC had granted New York's Consoli-
dated Edison a license to construct a hydroelectric project on the Hudson River at
Storm King Mountain. The license was opposed by conservation groups (in-
cluding the Sierra Club) who asserted threatened injury to conservation interests.
32. Id. at 615.
33. Act of Aug. 26, 1935, ch. 687, Title II, § 313, 49 Stat. 860.
34. 354 F.2d at 616.
35. 270 F. Supp. 650 (S.D. N.Y. 1967).
36. Id. at 661.
37. 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1970).
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of a freeway as "aggrieved parties" under the A.P.A. as well as the De-
partment of Transportation Act and the Hudson River Basin Compact
Act.
Nonetheless, while the liberal interpretation and application of the
A.P.A. in environmental litigation was being applied in most federal
courts"8 throughout the United States, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
balked in the Sierra Club case. 39 The ninth circuit, in reversing the dis-
trict court decision, denied the plaintiffs judicial review because (1) no
adversary position was stated between the Sierra Club and the federal
officials by the Club's assertion of a "special interest" in the conservation
and maintenance of national parks; and (2) plaintiff did not assert that
any of their own property or members' property interest was dam ged or
threatened by the agency action. The court observed:
We do not believe such club concern without a showing of more direct interest can
constitute standing in the legal sense sufficient to challenge the exercise of responsi-
bilities on behalf of all of the citizens by two cabinet level officials . . . acting under
Congressional and Constitutional authority.4 0
The court distinguished Scenic Hudson on the ground that standing there
was conferred by Section 313(b) of the Federal Power Act, which spe-
cifically grants the right of review to aggrieved parties. In Sierra Club,
however, no such statute was involved. The court also went on to
distinguish Road Review League by noting that plaintiffs in that case
were persons who would be directly affected by the government pro-
posal and had alleged specific economic injury.
Thus, the Sierra Club decision on its face seemed to reverse the trend
toward liberalization of standing requirements and carried forth the nega-
tive interpretation of Hardin.4' In holding that the Sierra Club com-
plaint failed to allege a sufficient interest to confer standing, the court
specifically distinguished its holding from those in other federal courts
which had accorded the club standing to object to alleged infringement
upon natural resources, by stating that the Sierra Club had been joined in
those actions by local residents and users of the affected area.42
38. West Virginia Highlands Conservancy v. Island Creek Coal Co., 441 F.2d
232 (4th Cir. 1971); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093
(D.C. Cir. 1970); Brooks v. Volpe, 329 F. Supp. 118 (W.D. Wash. 1971); Izaak
Walton League of America v. St. Clair, 313 F. Supp. 1312 (D. Minn. 1970).
39. 433 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1970).
40. Id. at 30.
41. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
42. Judge Trask's recent opinion in Alameda Conservation Association v. Cal-
ifornia, 437 F.2d 1087 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, Leslie Salt Co. v. Alameda Con-
servation Association, 402 U.S. 908 (1971), confirms the ninth circuit's strict in-
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Oddly, the appellate court decision holds, on the one hand, that standing
may be grounded upon "aesthetic, conservational and recreational interests"
and that the proposed actions are alleged to be "personally displeasing or
distasteful" to the Sierra Club and its members, and yet concludes, on the
other hand, that the Sierra Club is not "aggrieved" or "adversely af-
fected" within the meaning of the rules of standing. In support of that
view, they rely on Black's Law Dictionary to define "aggrieved" as "hav-
ing suffered loss or injury; damnified; injured."" The real reasons for
the court's inconsistency, however, is not readily explainable. One
possible explanation is that the traditional allegation of injury-in-fact
has been much too heavily relied upon in the decision. 44
In any event, by affirming 45 the ninth circuit opinion, the Supreme
Court has not specifically affirmed the strict approach to standing applied
by the ninth circuit. In fact, the opinion elucidates and affirms some of the
liberalized prerequisites of standing while requiring the complainant to
allege an injury to his own interest in order that the dispute will be ad-
judicated in an adversary context. The Court acknowledged that recre-
ational development of the Mineral King wilderness area and the attend-
ant destruction or adverse effects on the aesthetics and ecology of the
area constituted "injury in fact sufficient to lay the basis for standing un-
der §10 of the A.P.A. ' '4 ' But the Court concluded that such specific in-
jury would occur only to those who use the Mineral King area and as such
was not a concern of persons generally. 47
terpretation of standing requirements. The opinion stated that "[sitanding is not
established by suit initiated by this association simply because it has as one of its
purposes the protection of the 'public interest' in the wateis of the San Fiancisco
Bay. . . . Although recent decisions have considerably broadened the concept of
standing, we do not find that they go this far." Id. at 1090.
43. 433 F.2d at 32, n.8.
44. A clue to the ninth circuit's reluctance to "liberalize" its notions of standing
seems to stem from a concern over the flood of litigation argument. In Alameda
Conservation Association v. California, 437 F.2d 1087 (9th Cir. 1971), Judge
Trask's opinion stated that if various political, social, economic or environmental
clubs were to be granted standing to challenge elected state officials to protect a
public interest they "could wreak havoc with the administration of government, both
federal and state," 437 F.2d at 1090.
45. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
46. Id. at 734-35.
47. Justice Douglas' dissent focused on the general public concern for protection
of the environment and suggested, "[clontemporary public concern for protecting
nature's ecological equilibrium should lead to the conferral of standing upon environ-
mental objects to sue for their own preservation." Id. at 741-42. Justice Black-
mun's dissent recognized the Sierra Club's complaint not as "ordinary, run-of-the-
mill litigation. The case poses . . . significant aspects of a wide, growing, and dis-
turbing problem . . . the world's deteriorating environment. . . . Must our law be
[Vol. XXII
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The decision draws direct attention to the Sierra Club's failure to state
either in its pleadings or affidavits that any of its members use Mineral
King for any purpose, much less that they would be affected by agency
actions. In fairness, it can be observed that the Sierra Club specifically
declined to assert individualized harm 48 asserting instead that this was a
public action involving questions of natural resources and that the Club's
proven, dedicated and long-standing concern in such matters was suffi-
cient in itself to give it standing as a representative of the public interest.
The Court met this point, however, by observing that in the prior cases
cited as authority by the Sierra Club, the plaintiffs had either a specific
statutory grant of standing or had alleged injury to a direct economic in-
terest. Thus, the Court concluded that once an individual person seeking
review is granted standing, even under the most liberal rules, he may as-
sert the public interest in support of his claim against the agency.
While the Court obviously agreed that current decisions hod liberalized
the standing requirements and broadened the categories of injury and in-
terests protected from injury, it plainly did not abandon the requirement
that the party seeking review suffer or be threatened with injury. In
its strongest language, the Court reaffirmed that
a mere 'interest in a problem,' no matter how longstanding the interest and no mat-
ter how qualified the organization is in evaluating the problem, is not sufficient by it-
self to render the organization 'adversely affected' or 'aggrieved' within the meaning
of the A.P.A. 49
While the decision might appear to have effectively foreclosed all ad-
ministrative action from judicial review by individuals or public interest
groups, the opinion specifically reiterated, "[tihe test of injury in fact
goes only to the question of standing to obtain judicial review. Once this
standing is established, the party may assert the interests of the general
public in support of his claims for equitable relief."50
Examining the Court's holding in conjunction with prior cases, Sierra
Club affirms the ability of individuals or environmental action groups to
assert the public interest. But it does so only after that person or group
has asserted injury to its own interest. Since we have not yet approached
so rigid and our procedural concepts so inflexible that we render ourselves helpless
when the existing methods and the traditional concepts do not quite fit...?" Id.
at 755-56.
48. Sierra Club asserted that the proposed development effected the whole society
and was a matter of general public importance. Brief for Appellant at 19, Sierra
Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
49. 405 U.S. at 739.
50. Id. at 740, n.15.
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the point of Justice Douglas' dissent 5 and conferred standing to the in-
animate object about to be destroyed, environmental groups or con-
cerned citizens will have to work within the liberally interpreted confines
of the more traditional notions of standing.
Clearly, an imaginative expansion of the traditional notions of stand-
ing is needed to enable organizations such as the Sierra Club which have
well recognized interests in the area of the environment to litigate en-
vironmental issues. 52 While the initial reaction to the Sierra Club holding
indicates a setback in the battle to preserve the nation's natural resources,
it will likely prove to be the impetus needed to move toward new con-
cepts and imaginative expansion of standing in environmental litigation.
By requiring plaintiffs to allege a direct interest, the Court is merely af-
firming the constitutional notions of "complete adverseness" rather than
imposing an insurmountable burden on persons seeking relief. Environ-
mental groups, especially those with extensive national membership,
should find little difficulty in asserting a direct interest and proving that
some of its members use the particular environmental area the group is
trying to protect. 53 The strength of the opinion lies in the recognition that
aesthetic, conservational and recreational values have attained the status
of "legally protected interests" and in the resultant ability of citizens groups
to vindicate a public interest. As this note goes to print the Sierra Club
has amended its complaint to comply with the Supreme Court's opinion
and refiled it in the District Court of Northern California.
William L. Niro
51. Id. at 741.
52. See Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?-Toward Legal Rights for Natural
Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450 (1972).
53. See S.C.R.A.P. v. United States, 4 ERC 1312 (D.D.C. 1972). Plaintiff,
Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (S.C.R.A.P.), is an unincorpo-
rated association concerned with enhancing the quality of human environment for its
members. S.C.R.A.P. sought and obtained a preliminary injunction against the
Interstate Commerce Commission preventing the ICC from granting a 2.5 per-
cent railroad freight surcharge, claiming the surcharge would boost the shipping
costs of recyclable materials discouraging their use. The defendants rigorously
contested plaintiff's standing arguing plaintiff had no more than a general interest
in seeing the law enforced and have not distinguished themselves from other citi-
zens also concerned with the environment.
The plaintiffs in amending their complaint to comply with the holding in Sierra
Club, alleged that its members use the forests, streams, mountains and other re-
sources and that their use would be disturbed by the non-use of recyclable goods.
The Court afforded standing relying on the Data Processing and Sierra Club
holdings.
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